<u>INFORMATION REPORT</u> INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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- 1. In November or early December 1954 the Soviets requested the Central Committee of the Federation of Communists of Yugoslavia (FCY) to normalize relations with the Soviet Communist Party. The Soviets blamed Beria and the anti-Soviet, anti-Marxist attitudes of Milovan Djilas for the 1948 breek. The Soviets offered to disband the Yugoslav refugee organizations in the USSR and the Satellites, discontinue their intelligence and conspiratorial activities against Yugoslavia, start suitable propaganda themes and invite Tito to Moscow.
- 2. A few weeks later the Central Committee of the FCY replied as follows:
 - a. The entire Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party was responsible for the break.
 - b. The Yugoslavs broke with the Soviet Communist Party on questions of principle. No Yugoslav individuals, including Djilas, were responsible.
 - c. Although Yugoslavia was very interested in normalization on the governmental level, it did not wish to resume pre-1948 relations, preferring to remain independent. Collaboration between the Soviet and Yugoslav Communist Parties was a secondary matter, and would depend on the relations between the two governments.
 - d. As a prerequisite for further discussions, the Soviets should publicly admit their mistakes and send a top level delegation to Belgrade.

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
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The UDB and about 800 (sic) Soviet security men headed by General Serov collaborated on the security arrangements for the visit. The major part of the negotiations took place on the island of Brioni, where Tito spent considerable time in private discussions with Khrushchev.

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- 4. Members of the FCY maintain that Tito told the Soviet delegation that the further development of Yugoslav-Soviet relationships depended on the Soviet attitude towards the Satellites, which would, in effect, be the proof of the Soviets real intentions. The Soviets promised a policy change visavis the Satellites but stressed that they needed time to accomplish this.
- 5. Pro-Cominformists in Yugoslavia are disturbed at the Soviet-Yugoslav conference because they feel they have been sold out by the Soviets.
- 6. The Yugoslav economic situation makes it impossible for the Yugoslav Government to take any action which could result in a cut in U.S. aid.



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